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The European Commission has been placing increasing emphasis on the need for enhanced democratic participation in the EU.​[1]​ Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), as part of ‘civil society’ have been identified as a means of allowing individuals to become active in Brussels-based political life. The existence of Article I-47 (on the principle of participatory democracy) of the Constitutional Treaty would have given formal recognition to this role:

1. The institutions shall, by appropriate means, give citizens and representative associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas of Union action.

2. The institutions shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with representative associations and civil society.
…

The purpose of this article is to examine the different channels available to NGOs wishing to participate in law-making at the EU level, with a focus on Brussels-based NGOs involved in the social sector. It will begin with a brief explanation of the terms ‘NGO’ and ‘civil society’, and an exploration of the role of the European Economic and Social Committee as a channel for their input into law-making and the idea of NGO ‘consultative status’. It will then examine the means by which social NGOs engage with the main institutions (Commission, European Parliament and Council) when legislating and illustrate this with examples.

From an academic perspective, the interaction of interest groups generally with EU institutions has received significant attention from political scientists. Some commentators in this area have attempted to develop theoretical frameworks explaining the access to and potential influence of lobbyists on EU decision-making,​[2]​ others have conducted more particularised case-studies,​[3]​ while others still have explored how and why these groups relate to each other in coalescing around particular issues.​[4]​ However, mainstream legal scholarship, insofar as it has concerned itself with the existence of private interest groups, has been preoccupied principally with the potential of ‘civil society’ as a remedy (or possible threat) to the ‘democratic deficit’ of the EU.​[5]​ At the margins of legal scholarship a handful of writers (such as members of the Commission or NGOs) have chronicled the passage of legislation with which they have been involved.​[6]​ However, an attempt at surveying how private interest groups interact with EU institutions for an audience of legal scholars appears to be lacking.

It is not the role of this piece to provide a comprehensive overview of the means by which interest groups try to influence decision-making at the EU level, which would require extensive further study. There are a variety of actors engaged on a variety of issues with the EU institutions using a variety of practices, with varying degrees of success.​[7]​ Rather this article is limited to sketching out how a particular kind of interest group (non-governmental organisations working in the area of social policy) interacts with the principal EU institutions in the law-making process. More particularly it will enquire into the degree that relations between these NGOs and EU institutions are formalised or regularised. Accordingly, it does not address the practices or impact of NGOs working on other issues (such as the environment, public health, and human rights more generally),​[8]​ and it also omits the (probably more influential) activities of other actors such as business lobbyists and regional offices.​[9]​ It does not attempt to theorise or quantify the impact or the influence that these groups might have on law-making, except insofar as it provides particular examples as illustrations.​[10]​ Neither does it address the question of the accountability and legitimacy of these NGOs, nor the benefit they may bring and threat they may pose to democracy. 

There is no systematic chronicling of NGO involvement with particular legislative projects. Their own websites may publish policy documents, publicise meetings, and produce reports that might record or make reference to meetings. However, there is little in the way of an NGO writing a history of its ‘road to success’ with particular legislative projects. Furthermore the collective memories of many NGOs is quite short due to high staff turnovers, meaning that even seasoned members may only have been with the same NGO for a few years. These factors make it difficult to attempt a systematic analysis of how NGOs participate in the EU institutions. The article is based in part on a series of interviews with NGOs based in Brussels involved with social policy questions and members of the European Parliament (EP) and the Commission. This particular area was chosen simply as a means of establishing some kind of parameters for the investigation. It should therefore be seen as only a partial picture of relations between interest groups and the EU institutions.


A 	Terms: NGOs and ‘Civil Society’

There is no widely accepted definition of the term ‘NGO’, and this article does not attempt to furnish one. The Encyclopaedia of Public International Law defines NGOs as ‘private organizations (associations, federations, unions, institutes, groups) not established by a government or by intergovernmental agreement, which are capable of playing a role in international affairs by virtue of their activities’.​[11]​ Most writers would also exclude those groups which seek to acquire governmental power themselves (either by force or constitutionally), and enterprises which exist primarily to generate profit.​[12]​ Most definitions include religious organisations​[13]​ but some do not include transnational organisations of parliamentarians.​[14]​ A further qualification which seems to be impliedly recognised by most writers is the exclusion of ‘those voluntary associations (for example, many recreational clubs and service NGOs) that do not involve conscious attempts to shape policies, norms and structures in society at large.’​[15]​ 

Although the term ‘civil society’ has been used interchangeably with NGOs by some writers,​[16]​ it should be seen as wider than the latter since it ‘covers a range of both organised and unorganised’ groupings.​[17]​ The advantage of the term civil society is that it acknowledges that not all social and political forces are formally constituted as organisations.​[18]​ As this article is concerned with formally organised interest groups it will mainly employ the term NGO though some reference is made to ‘civil society’ (or ‘organised civil society’) where this terminology becomes appropriate. Accordingly, in employing the term NGO the article will generally be referring to a formally constituted organisation, which is operating beyond the spheres of government and commerce and is working towards the influencing the shape and direction of EU law and policy.​[19]​ 


B	The Informal Nature of EU-NGO Relations

There exists no generalised route granting access to the EU institutions or status of formal recognition for NGOs allowing them to feed into EU law-making. That is, there is no official ‘consultative status’ that NGOs can obtain, nor is there any express legal basis for dialogue or consultation with NGOs.​[20]​ This can be contrasted with other inter-governmental organisations, such as the United Nations. Article 71 of the UN Charter provides that the Economic and Social Council of the UN ‘may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence’. The relevant rules adopted by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31) provides that NGOs granted consultative status may, in their dealings with subsidiary bodies of the Economic and Social Council, propose items for inclusion in the agenda (para. 33); attend as observers to public meetings (para. 35);​[21]​ circulate written statements (para. 36); and be allowed to make oral statements during meetings (para. 38). The principal advantage of this, from the perspective of human rights oriented NGOs is that they have had access to the UN Commission on Human Rights (as a subsidiary body of the Economic and Social Council).​[22]​ The significance of this is that NGOs have direct access to a State forum, where they may raise awareness on issues of concern and attempt to stimulate political momentum behind particular enterprises.​[23]​ At the CHR’s 2003 session, for instance, NGOs used one third of the debating time.​[24]​ It has also allowed NGOs access (as observers) to the negotiation processes of many of the UN-sponsored human rights treaties elaborated over the past twenty years.​[25]​ 

Although the EU’s (as yet to enter into force) Constitutional Treaty makes some official provision for the participation of NGOs (insofar as they form part of ‘civil society’) in the work of the institutions,​[26]​ there is little in the way of a formally recognised right of access for NGOs in the current institutional framework. However, this does not mean that relations between the institutions and NGOs are completely unregulated, as will be discussed below. 


C	The Economic and Social Committee as Representative of ‘Civil Society’

It might be objected at the outset that ‘civil society’ already benefits from formal representation within the EU through the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC). The EESC is meant to gather ‘representatives of the various economic and social components of organised civil society, and in particular representatives of producers, farmers, carriers, workers, dealers, craftsmen, professional occupations, consumers and the general interest’ (ECT Article 257). Within the EU’s institutional framework it has ‘advisory status’ meaning that it may issue non-binding Opinions where it is requested to do so by the Council, Commission or EP or of its own motion (ECT, Article 262). Referrals to the EESC by the Commission or Council are mandatory for legislating in most substantive areas of EC competence.​[27]​ Recently the Commission affirmed the EESC as ‘institutional intermediary between the institutions of the Union and organised civil society’.​[28]​ The obvious question is: if the EESC is supposed to represent the range of social and economic interests from a ‘non-governmental’ perspective and has a formally recognised role in the legislative process, then what need can there be for other forms of non-governmental representation?

In response to this it must be said that there are important limitations to conceiving of the EESC as the formal voice of non-governmental interests across the EU, perhaps foremost among them being that members of the EESC are chosen by the Member States themselves (ECT, Article 259). Further to this, the structure of the EESC is such that two thirds of its membership is representative of employers and employees, leaving roughly only one third of the 317-strong EESC membership​[29]​ for the ‘various other economic and social components of organised civil society’.​[30]​ As Curtin points out, even if the representatives are not bound by any mandate, two thirds of EESC represent only two particular categories of socio-economic interest.​[31]​ Of the 100 or so representatives coming from the remainder of ‘organised civil society’ the EESC has established 4 sub-categories: 21 representatives belong to the agricultural sector, 20 belong to consumer and environmental organisations, 20 come from small and medium-sized enterprises, crafts and the professions, and 23 belong to ‘cooperatives, mutuals, associations, foundations and social NGOs’.​[32]​ Clearly, as the EESC itself has recognised, ‘EESC membership does not fully reflect the diversity and ongoing development of “organised civil society”’.​[33]​ Jeffrey writes that the ‘membership of the Committee… provides only patchy coverage of the possible spectrum of “economic and social activity” across the EU… The notion of [the EESC]… as a representative body is therefore difficult to sustain.’​[34]​

Further, the dynamics of EESC workings mean that any diversity of views within the EESC may not actually be fed back to the Commission, Council or EP. EESC Opinions must be formally approved by the representatives, meaning that divergent views are not unlikely to be lost in compromises, or may prevent an Opinion being adopted at all.​[35]​ The EESC has tried to portray this as a genuine synthesising of views where consensus is possible because of an exchange of information.​[36]​ However one characterises the process, surely it cannot be assumed that the range of interested parties within ‘civil society’ speak with only one voice, and this must be considered a serious flaw to any ambition that the EESC should truly represent all the ‘components of organised civil society’.

In acknowledgement of these limitations the EESC in 2004 established a ‘Liaison Group’ which formalised relations with various European civil society interests, which are not formally represented on the European Economic and Social Committee, in a ‘structured dialogue’​[37]​. The Liaison Group meets regularly with representatives of various sectors of ‘organised civil society’ at European level (among these organisations can be found certain which are concerned with social policy and human rights more generally such as the European NGO Confederation for Relief and Development (CONCORD), the European Women’s Lobby (EWL), and the European Disability Forum (EDF).​[38]​ Through their meetings the Liaison Group may receive input from interested European civil society organisations which may then be fed into an Opinion being drafted within the EESC (for instance, the Liaison Group has made a direct contribution to the drafting of the Opinion on the revision of the EC financial regulation applicable to the general budget in 2005 and has contributed to the work of the EESC on the Lisbon strategy).​[39]​





2. Relations with the Commission

As initiator of legislative proposals the ability of NGOs to access the Commission is particularly important as a means of stimulating and informing Commission action. The (binding) Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality​[42]​ and the (non-binding) Interinstitutional Agreement On Better Law-Making,​[43]​ require the Commission (though no other institutions) to ‘consult widely’ when formulating legislative proposals. The following section will discuss the formal and informal relationships that exist between the Commission and NGOs. It will be seen below that social NGOs often have pre-existing relationships with certain DGs allowing them easier access to the law-making process while other DGs are less accessible. 


A	General Principles and Minimum Standards for Consultation

The Commission conducts consultations as part of its ‘impact assessments’ to ensure that prospective legislation addresses the needs of and does not impose disproportionate burdens on Member States and private parties.​[44]​ Such consultations are sometimes ‘open’ in that the relevant DG makes a public call for comments on a prospective or existing proposal to which anyone can respond. The Commission has adopted the General Principles and Minimum Standards for Consultation of Interested Parties,​[45]​ to provide for standards of consultation where ‘open’ consultations are launched. To summarise, this document provides that where consultations are conducted the process should be clear, easy to follow and publicised, open to all those with a potential interest, operate within reasonable time-limits and contributions should be duly considered.​[46]​ However, there is no requirement to actually conduct such ‘open’ consultations in the first place, and interviewees noted that the Commission does not always conduct ‘open’ consultations when formulating a proposal.​[47]​

The Commission has stressed that the Guidelines themselves are not legally-binding, and thus legislation formulated without regard for these standards of consultation could not be used as a reason to impugn legislation before the European Court of Justice.​[48]​ Rather the Guidelines are intended as a policy document to guide instances where the Commission launches consultations on its own initiative, in contrast to those instances in the ECT which require formal consultation of certain bodies (such the Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of Regions, and the EP outside instances of codecision).​[49]​ At the same time it was noted by many interviewees that an NGO which felt that it had not been duly consulted by the Commission in breach of the guidelines could quite legitimately request the Parliamentary Ombudsman to examine their case. Interestingly however, most of those interviewed, including members of the Commission, did not seem to rely on or actually use the Guidelines explicitly. This is not to say that the Guidelines were being violated, but rather that in practice, relevant units inside the DGs of the Commission were usually already engaged in regular dialogue with those NGOs which might be interested in being consulted. In this way, even if the Commission did not launch an open consultation, interested parties were often aware of future proposals and the Commission was open to receive their comments and suggestions. In practice this arrangement functions well to the degree that NGOs are engaged with DGs that may impact on their area of interest, and relevant DGs keep them informed. However, the approach is not satisfactory if one considers that any DG might potentially have an impact on issues of social policy and some interviewees commented that it was extremely difficult to attempt to keep apace of Commission proposals across the various DGs. If time pressures prevent DGs conducting ‘open’ consultations as a matter of course, and the DG in question has no relations with NGOs, it is hard to see how NGOs might participate meaningfully. A recent example of this can be found in the proposal for the so-called ‘Services Directive’, in relation to which there does not appear to have been an ‘open’ consultation. The aim of the Directive is to facilitate the purchase of services by a consumer in one Member State from a service provider in another Member State by eliminating barriers to transboundary movement. NGOs involved in the delivery of social services or representing the interests of those vulnerable members of society dependent on social services,​[50]​ took exception to the ‘State of origin rule’.​[51]​ This provision would prevent the Member State of the consumer from requiring the service provider to conform to its domestic law, if it was already operating legally in its State of origin. This was of concern to social NGOs because if Member States were not able to impose higher domestic standards, they would be forced to allow delivery of cheaper and potentially lower quality social services from other States. It was argued that as vulnerable members of society, recipients of social services could not be expected to exercise an effective choice in the same way as consumers of other services, and there would be an ensuing ‘race to the bottom’ in the provision of social services.​[52]​ According to an NGO interviewed, it would appear that despite conducting consultations among consumers and service providers the Commission’s DG Internal Market largely failed to consider or consult adequately concerning the implications for social services.​[53]​ It was suggested that this was because there was little realisation within the DG (ostensibly more oriented towards facilitating commerce and trade) that social services should be subject to different considerations.​[54]​ The apparent lack of regular contact between DG Internal Market and social NGOs (perhaps because of the perceived irrelevance of the welfare of more vulnerable individuals to the goals of the internal market)​[55]​ meant that interested NGOs were unaware of the proposal until it was ready to be put to the EP.​[56]​ Following the EP’s amendments (arguably influenced by NGO advocacy),​[57]​ the amended Commission proposal removed the ‘State of origin’ rule and many ‘social services’ were exempted from the scope of the proposal.​[58]​

Perhaps the major drawback for NGOs, besides the fact that the Guidelines are not legally binding, is that they do not purport to oblige the Commission to actually conduct public consultations on all proposals in the first place. Because of this, where NGOs and relevant DGs do not have ongoing relations, it is quite possible for proposals to be introduced without the opportunity for NGOs to contribute their opinions or comments. Even if ‘open’ consultations delay the formation of proposals, the failure to consult adequately must surely result in delays later in the process (such as the resubmission of a proposal), as can be seen from the extensive amendments to the Services Directive that were proposed by the EP.

Those NGOs which do consult with the Commission may be included in a ‘CONECCS’ database (Consultation, the European Commission and Civil Society). Inclusion in the database is on a voluntary basis, subject to certain pre-requisites:

In order to be eligible, an organisation must be a non-profit representative body organised at European level, i.e. with members in two or more European Union or Candidate countries; be active and have expertise in one or more of the policy areas of the Commission, have some degree of formal or institutional existence; and be prepared to provide any reasonable information about itself required by the Commission, either for insertion on the database or in support of its request for inclusion​[59]​

Aside from ‘open’ consultations and those conducted in the context of impact assessments the Commission has also established a more general ‘structured’ dialogue with ‘civil society’ organisations, including NGOs. This takes the form of meetings (at least once a year) between the relevant Commission DG and a ‘consultative body’. These ‘consultative bodies’ are included within a separate directory of the CONECCS database. There does not seem to be a particular set of rules surrounding what organisations should be included within a consultative body, or whether a DG is obliged to engage in dialogue in this way at all. Rather, it seems that the Commission has simply attempted to give some formality and transparency to a process which had previously been more hidden. In the White Paper on European Governance, which led to the establishment of this system the Commission stated that:

There is currently a lack of clarity about how consultations are run and to whom the Institutions listen. The Commission runs nearly 700 ad hoc consultation bodies in a wide  range of policies. The increase in the volume of international negotiations generates further ad hoc consultation. The Commission believes it needs to rationalise this unwieldy system not to stifle discussion, but to make it more effective and accountable both for those consulted and those receiving the advice.​[60]​





As suggested in the previous section, relations between NGOs and the Commission tend to be fairly informal. NGOs have tended simply to contact DGs on the basis either that they may be formulating proposals that are of interest to them, or because they wish them to contemplate proposals on particular issues. The manner and conditions under which many social NGOs gain access to the Commission might be considered a little unorthodox. While NGOs in general may be more traditionally ‘detached’ from the EU institutions, and come more ostensibly from the ‘outside’, there is a significant body of Brussels-based NGOs operating in the sphere of social policy that have financial and operational links with the Commission offering both a potential point of contact with the Commission and a potential constraint on their own activities.

A significant number of social NGOs interviewed survive heavily on Commission funding to exist.​[66]​ This funding seemed to take two forms. On the one hand what might be called ‘core’ funding, and on the other ‘project’ funding.​[67]​ Many NGOs operating at the Brussels level are themselves built upon a network of national NGOs which make up their members. It was indicated by several interviewees that the Commission has strongly encouraged the formation of (not to say effectively established) these ‘network’ NGOs at the Brussels level. It would seem that these act as an interface between the Commission and national NGOs. For instance, the Commission provides almost all of the funding for the NGO ‘The Social Platform’, an umbrella organisation for Brussels-based social NGOs. Under this particular funding line the Commission remarks that ‘The Social Platform will facilitate participatory democracy in the European Union by promoting the consistent involvement of social NGOs within a structured civil dialogue with the EU institutions.’​[68]​ The Brussels-based member NGOs of the ‘umbrella’ organisation Social Platform are themselves networks of national NGOs in the various Member States. Many of these Brussels-based social NGOs also rely on the Commission for funding. The Commission provides funding these NGOs both to carry out particular projects or generally to maintain relations with their national member NGOs.​[69]​ According to interviewees (and this is also apparent from the General Budget itself) Brussels-level NGOs may be effectively subcontracted by the Commission for the purposes of awareness-raising, report-writing, data collection and checking compliance with EC Law by Member States.​[70]​ The potentially top-down nature of the Commission-funded social NGOs is evident in the frustrations some of them expressed during interviews. Several interviewees indicated that they had difficulty in convincing their national member NGOs of the relevance of EU law. They also felt that while they were able to act as a channel from the EU down to their national members, it was difficult for the flow to be reversed and for them to reflect the demands of their national members by lobbying the Commission or other EU institutions. This was because Commission funding prescribed the activities and topics to which they should dedicate themselves. Smaller NGOs (with only one or two staff) were accordingly unable to devote time to other projects (such as campaigning on behalf of their national member NGOs) without failing to fulfil their contractual agreements to the Commission. 

However, NGOs with larger staff have found themselves able to participate more meaningfully. In this way it is possible to point to instances where Commission-funded social NGOs have themselves presented the Commission with suggestions for legislative proposals, including entire draft directives. For instance, the European Disability Forum has launched a draft text for a ‘Disability Specific Directive’ (i.e. a directive specifically addressing discrimination against people with disabilities).​[71]​ While the Commission has yet to formally submit such a proposal to the Council, it does seem to have indicated that such a directive is desirable at some (indeterminate) future date and discussion is still underway between the Commission and interested NGOs.​[72]​ Perhaps the best-documented example of an NGO submitting a draft text for legislation to the Commission is that of the ‘Starting Line Group’ (SLG)​[73]​ with the draft text for a directive combating discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity and religion.​[74]​ The SLG initially produced a text in 1993 but was unable to persuade the Commission that the EC Treaty accorded it sufficient competence to legislate in this area.​[75]​ Because of this SLG and other Brussels-based NGOs campaigned for the EC Treaty to be amended at the 1996 Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference to grant the EC the necessary competence in this area. The text of Article 13 (and an additional paragraph in Article 3) largely reflect the SLG proposals and the existence of these additions to the EC Treaty is credited by many to the SLG’s campaigning.​[76]​ After the amendment of the EC Treaty the SLG revised its original proposal which it re-launched in 1998.​[77]​ The proposal of the Commission that appeared in 1999 reflected that of the SLG in many respects. Yu and Chopin note that ‘the European Commission has carefully studied and frequently borrowed from the Starting Line, as was requested on more than one occasion by the European Parliament.’​[78]​ An interviewee involved in the process noted that while the Commission was drawing up its proposal it was in close and frequent contact with the SLG.​[79]​ 

It is plausible to attribute much credit to the SLG for the existence of the Race Discrimination Directive which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race and ethnicity in the field of employment and the delivery of certain services.​[80]​ While there are some differences the proposal of the Commission largely reflects the substance of the SLG’s proposal (which pre-dated that of the Commission) and the final adopted Directive was even closer to the SLG’s proposal.​[81]​ More commonly, however, NGOs react to Commission proposals or open consultations rather than taking the initiative themselves. Sometimes the Commission can be extremely open to NGO suggestions. Thus an interviewee from the Commission indicated that the suggestions received from NGOs in response to the Commission’s open consultation on the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency essentially formed the basis for the Commission’s proposal.​[82]​ In this case the Commission, while having some ideas of its own, relied on the suggestions of human rights NGOs because they felt that a Fundamental Rights Agency would not be able to function without the support of human rights NGOs. For this reason it was desirable to formulate a proposal to create a body that they felt they would be able to work with.​[83]​ 

Some writers have characterised the EU-funding of NGOs as ‘co-option’ where the Commission creates a relationship of mutual support.​[84]​ According to this view the Commission may be receptive to calls from interest groups because these will lead to expanded powers and competences for the Commission.​[85]​ In this sense an interviewee from the Commission pointed out that it was advantageous to have as broad a support as possible from NGOs behind particular proposals because the Council was more likely to take such proposals seriously as having genuine grassroots support. If one considers that the Commission funds many social NGOs it would seem like a case of the Commission pulling itself up by its bootstraps by creating allies (by funding NGOs) which it then relies on as an additional means of exerting pressure on Member States in the Council.​[86]​ 

However, this may be an extreme view. As can be seen from the resistance of the Commission to the initial calls for a Race Discrimination Directive, it is evident that the Commission will always take into consideration the likelihood of Member State approval. Furthermore while the Commission may fund social NGOs the purpose behind this is either to enable them to complete particular projects or to allow them to act as an interface with their national members. These NGOs are not expected and do not necessarily conform to the views of the Commission (as is evident from their work in the EP). It was also pointed out by interviewees that there are significant drawbacks in obliging NGOs to find sources of funding beyond the Commission itself and good reasons why Commission funding – as public money – is practically and ideologically sound. If one considers that it is in the public interest to facilitate democratic participation then it follows that this should be supported by public finance.​[87]​ By investing in NGOs who are representative of vulnerable groups in society the Commission is giving a voice to those people who otherwise may lack the resources to participate actively in the democratic process. Were such organisations forced to rely only on the donations of those they were trying to represent, the collection of these funds would in itself imply significant costs and tap resources from groups who may already find themselves in financial difficulty. Alternatively if NGOs were expected to seek funds from grant-giving foundations or businesses (in the context of their charitable activities) this would certainly pose a greater threat to their independence than public funding as such donors are likely to demand a role in setting the agenda of NGOs in place of their grass-roots constituents. Furthermore in seeking funding from multiple sources NGOs would be obliged to divert more resources to fund-raising activities as well as having to report back to a multiplicity of stakeholders. Thus while it may be right to question whether Commission funding can affect the independence of NGOs it must be realised that alternatives to this are unsatisfactory and even damaging to democratic participation.


3 Relations with the European Parliament

This section will first describe the way in which NGOs participate in the EP. It will be seen that this can be characterised as ‘quasi formal’, in that there is some formal regulation of informal activities. Interviewees indicated that it was routine for NGOs to meet MEPs for the purposes of advocating particular causes.​[88]​ This section will focus on the role of ‘Intergroups’ which has thus far received little attention in academic literature.​[89]​ While it should be borne in mind that NGOs do engage in the activities discussed below without participating in these groups, coordination between NGOs and MEPs through parliamentary Intergroups seems to represent the most efficient and consistent means of influencing MEPs. 

A Parliamentary Intergroup is an informal, cross-party collection of MEPs who form around a particular interest.​[90]​ They are ‘informal’ in the sense that they are not considered to be organs of the EP,​[91]​ and are not permitted to use the EP logo or names that might suggest that they are official organs of the EP.​[92]​ However, Intergroups may be ‘registered’ or ‘unregistered’.​[93]​ In order to register an Intergroup must have the support of three political groups, provide a list of its members and declare any financial or material support received from third parties.​[94]​ There is no financial support from the EP for registered Intergroups but they do benefit from translation facilities (where they are available) and from the ability to reserve meeting rooms (which is done formally through one of the supporting political groups). However, registered Intergroups must also undertake firstly, only to meet in Strasbourg (where the EP convenes for a week each month) and secondly, only to meet on one of two designated meeting times (to prevent conflict with EP sessions and in particular voting).​[95]​ Because of the high demand for facilities such meetings are in practice restricted to one hour in length.​[96]​ Such meetings usually allow time only for two speakers and limited dialogue among those attending. Further to this, while Strasbourg allows easy access to large numbers of MEPs (due to the practical difficulty of reaching and leaving Strasbourg), meetings are removed from the gaze of other NGOs and the media, which are concentrated in Brussels. It is these restrictions that might encourage some MEPs not to ‘register’ their Intergroup, giving them a freer hand in arranging meetings in Brussels. Having said this, registered Intergroups do seem to make efforts to escape these restrictions by running ‘seminars’ or ‘public hearings’ in Brussels rather than official meetings. 

Intergroups are run by a ‘Bureau’ or ‘executive’ of MEPs (with one chairperson and sometimes several vice-chairs), who are assisted by and cooperate with a ‘secretariat’ or ‘coordinator’. MEPs may become ‘members’ of an Intergroup that interests them, though it is not usual for all MEP members to attend every Intergroup meeting. Rather, attendance tends to be dictated by the issue under discussion and whether that MEP has an interest. Thus, different meetings will usually attract different faces. The secretariat or coordinator is often provided from outside the EP by an entity interested in the work of the Intergroup.​[97]​ Thus, for those Intergroups formed around human rights and social policy issues, it is typical for the secretariat or coordinator to be ‘donated’ by an interested NGO.​[98]​ For example, the coordinator of the Anti-Racism and Diversity Intergroup is provided by the European Network Against Racism, and the coordinator of the Disability Intergroup is provided by the European Disability Forum.​[99]​ 

The Intergroup coordinator or secretariat will often determine the agenda of meetings in conjunction with the bureau or executive of MEPs. Speakers are usually invited to make a presentation on the issue under discussion and these speakers are often organised and selected by the coordinator either in the form of some personal testimonial or expert academic. A member of staff of the Commission may also be invited to speak where a Commission proposal is under discussion, as may the relevant Committee Rapporteur preparing the EP’s response to a Commission proposal, and (less often) a representative from the Council.​[100]​

Intergroups provide those NGOs in the role of coordinator or secretariat the opportunity to inform and to influence the various parties that attend their meetings. At a minimum they allow MEPs who are already ‘converted’ to the particular cause of the Intergroup to be kept informed of developments in the field and, importantly, of concerns surrounding legislative proposals from the Commission that are under consideration by the EP. This allows interested MEPs to take a concerted and informed stance when they are involved in the process of writing the EP’s response to a Commission proposal. This might be done by lobbying MEPs in the same political group who are members of the relevant Committee, and by advocating their views where they are involved in the Committee themselves. Thus, even where the Intergroup does not attract ‘uncommitted’ MEPs it is able to have an impact on the legislative process. Where a Committee Rapporteur attends the meetings they are often requested to reflect particular points of concern in their report and they may be presented with specific amendments that they are requested to insert into the EP’s response to a Commission proposal. The texts of such suggestions tend to be drafted by the coordinating NGO. While some Intergroups have ‘closed’ meetings, that are announced only to their members, Intergroups in the area of human rights and social policy tend to have more open approaches, announcing their meetings as widely as possible. This allows for the possibility of influencing MEPs who have an interest in the issue, but might not necessarily be committed to the Intergroup’s broader aims. The coordinator or secretariat thus have the opportunity to open up a debate the tenor and parameters of which they have largely set (in conjunction with the bureau) where their point of view is prioritised among an audience directly involved in the law-making process. Interviewees expressed the view that this role was less one of lobbying than advocacy, which seems accurate given the nature of the meetings which involves more of an exchange of views and information than the exertion of direct pressure.

Clearly, Intergroups become more important for NGOs where they have concerns about the content of Commission proposals. For instance, the Disability Intergroup seems to have played a not insignificant role in the EP’s amendments to the Commission’s proposal for a Regulation concerning the rights of disabled persons and persons with reduced mobility when travelling by air. A reading of the Commission’s initial proposal, together with the EDF’s response paper,​[101]​ the EP’s amendments (which were accepted by the Commission and the Council)​[102]​ and the final version of the Regulation​[103]​ certainly suggests the EDF’s influence. By way of example it is possible to see that the title of the Regulation was changed in a way that reflected the EDF’s concerns,​[104]​ and the scope of the Regulation was widened to expressly include all people with disabilities and not just those whose disabilities interfered directly with their mobility.​[105]​ Another example can be seen in the amendment of Article 7 which exempted airports with annual traffic of less than 200 million passengers per year from the standards of assistance to disabled passengers. The EDF’s response paper indicated that there should be no such blanket exemption, but rather that the standards should be adopted according to the size of the airport, and this is the approach adopted by the EP’s amendment.​[106]​ It seems that the Disability Intergroup allowed the EDF to play an important role in influencing these changes. The Disability Intergroup facilitated exchanges of information on the Regulation through discussions between the relevant EP Committees’ shadow-rapporteurs and a roundtable meeting with MEPs and other interested parties. Significantly the Rapporteur of the Committee was himself a member of the Intergroup, allowing the EDF to feed directly into the amendments.​[107]​

As well as impacting on the EP’s response to existing legislative proposals Intergroups may also facilitate the creation of EP Written Declarations.​[108]​ For example, the EP’s written declaration on racism in football was authored and proposed jointly by MEPs involved in the Anti-Racism and Diversity Intergroup.​[109]​ The Intergroup was used as a means of communicating with and pressuring MEPs to sign the declaration. ENAR (acting in its own name and as secretariat of the Intergroup) both contacted MEPs directly as well as requesting its members to lobby MEPs at the national level, and the Declaration was later adopted by the EP after collecting over 400 MEP signatures.​[110]​ The EP may also be used as a tool to pressure the Commission to initiate legislation, as can be seen from an EP resolution urging the Commission to make a proposal for a race discrimination directive based on the text of the SLG.​[111]​

Thus the EP seems to be much more amenable and less fractured and complicated to deal with for NGOs than the Commission. MEPs and NGOs seem to be engaged in a mutually beneficial relationship where MEPs have the opportunity to be kept informed while NGOs have the chance to exert some influence. This means that apart from direct contact with MEPs at Intergroup meetings NGOs involved in the secretariat can expect to have committed Intergroup members in Committees as allies on issues of interest to them. This relationship with the EP, which is largely informal and only partially regulated (in terms of limitations on official Intergroup meetings) is important where NGOs have been unable to adequately participate in the consultation process with the Commission (as was the case with the Services Directive) or where the Commission has not incorporated all the concerns of NGOs into its proposals (as with the Regulation on air travel). It is also useful as a means of raising the visibility of issues or exerting pressure on other institutions to take some action (as in the case of the SLG’s proposal).

4 Relations with the Council of Ministers of the European Union

All directives and regulations are discussed or negotiated within the Council of Ministers, and none may be adopted without its formal approval, which makes it the most powerful of the legislative bodies. Despite the power of the Council of Ministers, it does not seem readily accessible to NGOs wishing to make their views known. There is no formal channel for NGOs to come to the Council, and informal relations are difficult to maintain. The vast majority of legislative instruments are negotiated only within the preparatory bodies of the Council, known as working groups (to which NGOs have no direct access),​[112]​ later receiving formal assent by the relevant Committee of the Council.​[113]​ Interviewees indicated that it is difficult to obtain up-to-date information in a prompt manner on the state of negotiations, the identity of the officials involved, and there is no means to submit documents directly to the Council for consideration. Despite the adoption of Regulation 1049/2001 creating a right of access to EP, Council and Commission documents,​[114]​ many NGOs feel that they do not have the human or time resources that would be required to obtain sufficient information or points of contact in order to follow negotiations in a meaningful manner. Agenda or timetable documents, for instance, while indicating the venue, date and time for working group meetings, do not identify the chairperson or other members of the group making it difficult for interested parties to know who to contact in order to make their views known.​[115]​ Agenda documents do indicate the responsible member of the Council secretariat for a particular working group, and it is possible for interested parties to transmit comments which will be forwarded to the chairperson of the working group, who has discretion to distribute these to the other members of the group.​[116]​ While the Council’s register of documents also contains minutes of working group meetings, it is not possible to access their contents directly. A request for the document may be sent to the register, but a member of the Council Secretariat indicated that in general these would not be revealed while discussions are ongoing because disclosure could damage negotiations.​[117]​ These circumstances make it difficult for NGOs to follow or participate meaningfully in negotiations of the Council. Nevertheless there are some ‘indirect’ relations with the working groups. Firstly, NGOs may keep apace of and attempt to influence negotiations through the Commission. Thus, interviews revealed that the Commission DG for Justice, Freedom and Security would meet regularly with certain NGOs to inform them of the state of negotiations and receive their views and recommendations, which the Commission might then transmit in future working group meetings. Secondly, NGOs (usually those with greater resources) might themselves (should they succeed in discovering the identity of members of the working group) meet with Member State representatives outside of meetings to discuss the state of negotiations and present their views (should a representative be receptive). NGOs may also be able to rely on a representative to supply them with up-to-date documents. The impact that such contact might have is clearly dependent on the individual personalities involved as well as the political constraints of Member State representatives. As an example of this the EDF held bilateral meetings with all Member States over the revision of the structural funds regulations requesting the mainstreaming of the principles of non-discrimination and accessibility so that projects funded within the structural funds would not risk creating fresh barriers for people with disabilities.​[118]​ Thirdly, NGOs might attempt to convince the Member State holding the presidency of the EU (and therefore chairing its meetings) to take its views into account or prioritise certain issues. Accordingly, one NGO indicated that because it was concerned that the proposal for the creation of a Fundamental Rights Agency was moving down the political agenda​[119]​ it worked to persuade the Austrian presidency of its importance, which placed greater emphasis (according to some, too great) on establishing the Agency during its tenure.​[120]​ Rather than attempting to access the Council in this way, most NGOs interviewed indicated that when it came to influencing members of the Council, they would proceed via the national level. Thus national sections or national NGOs belonging to a European NGO network would be urged by their EU-level counterparts to pressure their governments (via the relevant minister) to adopt particular stances within Council negotiations.​[121]​ 
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